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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  consider	  certain	  consequences	  of	  large	  post-­‐crisis	  capital	  flows	  in	  advanced	  
economies.	   Specifically,	   I	   offer	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   Swiss	   response	   to	   large	   capital	   inflows	   during	   the	  
early	   stages	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	  Why	   did	   the	   Swiss	   National	   Bank	   (SNB)	   intervene	   in	   the	   forex	  
market	   and	   introduce	   an	   exchange	   rate	   floor?	   Why	   did	   the	   SNB	   gamble	   with	   its	   highly	   valued	   anti-­‐
inflationary	   reputation	   in	   attempting	   to	   stem	   the	   appreciation	   of	   the	   Swiss	   franc?	   To	   answer	   these	  
questions,	   this	  paper	  suggests	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  complete	  explanation	  than	  one	  that	   focuses	  solely	  on	  
the	  configuration	  of	  domestic	   interests.	  Specifically,	   the	  paper	  argues	   that	  a	   thorough	  explanation	  of	   the	  
SNB’s	   response	   requires	   accounting	   for	   the	   changing	   monetary	   paradigm	   of	   the	   central	   banking	  
community.	   This	   emerging	  monetary	   paradigm	   influenced	   the	   SNB’s	   policy	   decisions	   by	  making	   the	   SNB	  
particularly	  sensitive	  to	  financial	  stability	  risks	  and	  by	  providing	  it	  with	  the	  policy	  space	  to	  experiment	  with	  
(macroprudential)	  tools	  to	  manage	  these	  risks.	  
	  













In	   September	   2010,	   Brazilian	   Finance	  Minister	  Guido	  Mantega	   coined	   the	   term	   "currency	  war"	   after	   the	  
first	  wave	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  led	  to	  what	  he	  regarded	  as	  a	  protectionist	  devaluation	  
of	   the	   US	   dollar	   against	   other	   currencies.	   As	   the	   easing	   of	   monetary	   policy	   in	   the	   advanced	   world	  
encouraged	   massive	   capital	   flows	   toward	   more	   profitable	   investment	   opportunities,	   several	   emerging	  
market	   countries	   found	   themselves	   in	   the	   difficult	   position	   of	   coping	   with	   the	   financial	   instability	   and	  
macroeconomic	  consequences	  associated	  with	  large	  capital	  inflows.i	  In	  this	  context,	  renewed	  attention	  has	  
been	  devoted	  to	  determining	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  mix	  that	  national	  authorities	  should	  adopt	  to	  address	  
capital	   surges	   and	   volatility	   (IMF,	   2012b;	   Ostry	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Political	   economy	   scholars	   have	   grown	  
increasingly	  interested	  in	  examining	  the	  policies	  adopted	  by	  emerging	  market	  countries	  in	  such	  situations,	  
including	   previously	   neglected	   policies,	   such	   as	   capital	   account	   regulations	   (Gallagher,	   2011;	   Gallagher,	  
Griffith-­‐Jones	  and	  Ocampo,	  2011).	  
Although	  the	  scholarly	  debate	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  capital	  volatility	  has	  thus	  far	  focused	  on	  
emerging	  market	   countries,	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis	  has	  also	  affected	   several	   advanced	  economies.	   The	  
exodus	  of	  investment	  from	  the	  sluggish	  economies	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  safe-­‐
haven	  assets	  that	  followed	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  have	  pushed	  capital	  flows	  toward	  
several	  advanced	  economies.	  This	  inflow	  has	  led	  to	  sharp	  appreciations	  of	  the	  Australian	  dollar,	  the	  Swiss	  
franc,	   and	   the	   Japanese	   yen,	   among	  others.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   currency	  war	  Mantega	   foresaw	  has	   not	  
been	  confined	  to	  emerging	  market	  countries.	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  consider	  certain	  consequences	  of	   large	  post-­‐crisis	   capital	   flows	   in	  
advanced	  economies.	  I	  offer	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  Swiss	  response	  to	  the	  capital	  inflows	  that	  have	  flooded	  
the	  country	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  Specifically,	  I	  examine	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Swiss	  
National	  Bank	  (SNB)	  to	  openly	  intervene	  in	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  (forex)	  markets	  to	  stem	  the	  appreciation	  
of	  –	  and	  to	  explicitly	  cap	  –	  the	  Swiss	  franc	  as	  its	  main	  monetary	  policy	  objective	  since	  2011.	  	  
	  	   The	   SNB	   exchange	   rate	   policy	   is	   puzzling	   in	   a	   number	   of	   respects.	   First,	   the	   SNB	   had	   stopped	  
targeting	   the	   exchange	   rate	   in	   the	   1990s,	   which	   was	   consistent	   with	   most	   advanced	   economies,	   as	  
domestic	  authorities	  grew	   increasingly	  skeptical	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	   forex	   interventions	  (also	  Bordo	  and	  
Schwartz,	  1991;	  Neely,	  2011:	  309).	  Furthermore,	   the	  SNB’s	   response	  entails	   serious	   risks	   for	   the	  conduct	  
and	   credibility	   of	   its	   monetary	   policy.	   In	   particular,	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	   below,	   accumulating	   foreign	  
reserves	   to	   prevent	   domestic	   currency	   appreciation	   expands	   the	   domestic	  money	   supply	   and	   generates	  
inflationary	  pressures,	  particularly	  if	  the	  intervention	  is	  not	  appropriately	  sterilized.	  Forex	  intervention	  also	  
creates	  risks	  to	  domestic	  financial	  stability.	   Indeed,	   increases	  in	  central	  bank	  foreign	  assets	  almost	  always	  
expand	   the	   balance	   sheet	   of	   the	   banking	   system.	   This	   expansion	   can	   support	   booms	   in	   credit	   and	   asset	  
prices	  that	  may	  be	  followed	  by	  collapses	  (Moreno,	  2011).	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  risks,	  why	  did	  the	  SNB	  decide	  to	   intervene	  in	  the	  forex	  market	  and	  shift	   from	  its	  
long-­‐standing	  floating	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  to	  an	  exchange	  rate	  floor?	  Why	  did	  it	  decide	  to	  gamble	  with	  its	  
highly	   valued	   anti-­‐inflationary	   reputation;	   a	   reputation	  which,	   before	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   SNB	  openly	  
regarded	  as	  its	  "most	  important	  capital"	  (Baltensperger,	  Hildebrand	  and	  Jordan,	  2007:	  20)?	  
This	  paper	  suggests	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  complete	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  that	  does	  not	  focus	  
solely	   on	   the	   configuration	   of	   domestic	   interests	   or	   on	   the	   institutions	   that	   allow	   those	   interests	   to	  
influence	  exchange	  rate	  policies	  (e.g.,	  Bearce,	  2003;	  Broz	  and	  Frieden,	  2001;	  Frieden,	  1991;	  Henning,	  1994;	  
Kinderman,	   2008;	   Walter,	   2008).	   Although	   the	   economic	   interests	   of	   the	   Swiss	   export	   sector	   –	   whose	  
international	  competitiveness	  was	  damaged	  by	  the	  appreciating	  Swiss	  franc	  –	  were	  certainly	   important	  in	  
the	  political	  debate	  that	  surrounded	  the	  SNB’s	  monetary	  decisions,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  
the	   SNB’s	   response	   also	   requires	   consideration	   of	   the	   features	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   central	   bank	   decision	  
making.	   In	   particular,	   this	   explanation	  must	   take	   into	   account	   the	   unraveling	   of	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	  
policy	   consensus	   in	   the	   international	   central	   banking	   community	   and	   the	   ongoing	   debate	   over	   what	  
monetary	  policy	  actually	  entails.	  This	  debate	  influenced	  the	  SNB’s	  policy	  decisions	  by	  making	  it	  particularly	  
sensitive	   to	   the	   growing	   risks	   in	   its	   financial	   sector.	   The	  unraveling	  of	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	   consensus	  
also	  offered	   the	   central	   bank	   the	  policy	   space	   to	   test	  new	  policy	   instruments	  with	  which	   to	  manage	   the	  
potential	  risks	  associated	  with	  its	  exchange	  rate	  policy.	  
Prior	   to	  2007-­‐08,	   the	  established	  view	   in	  central	  banking	  circles	  was	   that	  monetary	  policy	   should	  
focus	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  price	  stability.	  After	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis,	  however,	  this	  limited	  understanding	  
of	   monetary	   policy	   was	   questioned,	   and	   increasing	   attention	   has	   been	   devoted	   to	   "the	   restoration	   of	  
financial	  stability	  policy	  to	  co-­‐equal	  status	  with	  monetary	  policy"	  (Bernanke,	  2011).	  While	  the	  principle	  of	  
bringing	   financial	   stability	   ‘up	   to	   par’	   with	   monetary	   stability	   is	   almost	   unquestioned	   in	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
environment,	  the	  debate	  is	  still	  open	  on	  the	  instruments	  through	  which	  financial	  stability	  can	  be	  ensured.	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  space	  for	  experimentation	  with	  new	  policy	  tools	  has	  expanded	  in	  that	  the	  policy	  rate	  is	  
no	  longer	  considered	  the	  only	  instrument	  that	  a	  central	  bank	  can	  use.	  As	  a	  result,	  macroprudential	  (MPR)	  
measures	  are	  now	  also	   included	   in	   the	  policy	   toolkit	   that	  monetary	  authorities	  are	  expected	   to	  use.	  The	  
expectation	  to	  use	  MPR	  measures	  is	  particularly	  strong	  when	  there	  is	  incompatibility	  between	  the	  interest	  
rate	   required	   for	   monetary	   policy	   objectives	   and	   that	   required	   for	   financial	   stability	   objectives.	   This	  
incompatibility	  occurred	  in	  Switzerland	  when	  the	  exchange	  rate	  invalidated	  the	  interest	  rate	  as	  an	  available	  
instrument	  to	  dampen	  persistent	  growth	  in	  credit	  volumes	  and	  was	  resolved	  consistent	  with	  the	  emerging	  
central-­‐banking	  consensus.	  Indeed,	  the	  SNB	  intervened	  in	  the	  forex	  markets	  and	  pegged	  its	  exchange	  rate,	  
which	   meant	   it	   relinquished	   control	   of	   its	   monetary	   base.	   Simultaneously,	   however,	   it	   adopted	   MPR	  
measures	  such	  as	  countercyclical	  capital	  requirements	  to	  offset	  the	  upward	  pressures	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  
credit	  and	  housing	  prices.	  
In	   short,	   the	   modalities	   through	   which	   the	   SNB	   conducted	   its	   exchange	   rate	   policy	   reflect	   the	  
ideational	   reconsideration	   that	   is	   occurring	   in	   the	   international	   central	   banking	   community.	   Based	   on	   a	  
broader	  understanding	  of	   the	   scope	  of	  monetary	  policy	   than	   the	  understanding	   that	  dominated	   the	  pre-­‐
crisis	  period,	  the	  SNB	  heeded	  the	  lessons	  that	  the	  maintenance	  of	  financial	  stability	  is	  as	  critical	  as	  ensuring	  
price	  stability	  and	  experimented	  MPR	  tools	  to	  complement	  interest	  rate	  policy	  in	  order	  meet	  the	  challenges	  
that	  derive	  from	  the	  selected	  exchange	  rate	  strategy.	  	  
To	  support	  my	  arguments,	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  SNB’s	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  decisions	  from	  early	  2009	  to	  
2012.	  This	  analysis	   is	  based	  on	   the	  public	  pronouncements	  of	   SNB	  officials	   and	  on	   the	   studies	  and	  press	  
releases	  that	  the	  SNB	  issues	  as	  an	  institution.	  Accounts	  from	  the	  international	  and	  domestic	  financial	  press,	  
in	  addition	  to	  the	  secondary	  literature,	  are	  also	  used	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  SNB’s	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  
By	  examining	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  SNB	  responded	  to	  the	  appreciation	  of	  the	  Swiss	  franc,	  this	  paper	  
will	  make	  a	  number	  of	  important	  contributions	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  this	  special	  matter.	  First,	  by	  illuminating	  
the	  macroeconomic	  challenges	  that	  have	  confronted	  advanced	  economies	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  post-­‐crisis	  
capital	  volatility,	  this	  paper	  offers	  comparative	  insights	  on	  the	  policy	  tools	  that	  different	  groups	  of	  countries	  
employ	  when	  confronted	  with	  similar	  challenges.	  Indeed,	  the	  paper	  draws	  attention	  to	  an	  alternative	  set	  of	  
unorthodox	  measures	  introduced	  in	  several	  emerging	  and	  developing	  economies	  next	  to	  the	  use	  of	  capital	  
controls.	   Second,	   this	   paper	   advances	   the	   political-­‐economy	   literature	   on	   the	   exchange	   rate	   by	   shifting	  
attention	   from	   the	   factors	   that	   influence	   governmental	   decision	   making	   to	   those	   that	   shape	   central	  
bankers’	   preferences.	   Finally,	   this	   paper	   expands	   on	   the	   recent	   international	   political	   economy	   (IPE)	  
literature	   that	   addresses	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   changes	   in	   global	   financial	   governance	   by	   showing	   that	   the	  
"macroprudentialist	   turn"	   influences	  not	  only	   the	   realm	  of	   financial	   regulation	  (Baker,	  2012)	  but	  also	   the	  
conduct	   of	   monetary	   policy.	   Although	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	   the	   current	   debate	   among	   monetary	  
authorities	  represents	  a	  lasting	  deviation	  from	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	  consensus,	  one	  of	  the	  contributions	  
of	  this	  paper	   is	  to	  emphasize	  certain	   ideational	  aspects	  that	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  serious	  reconsideration	  
since	  the	  crisis	  began.	  	  
Before	  proceeding,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  immediately	  clarify	  the	  specific	  aims	  of	  this	  paper.	  This	  study	  
does	  not	  engage	  in	  testing	  the	  importance	  of	  competing	  domestic	  and	  international	  factors;	  I	  recognize	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  domestic	  impact	  of	  exchange	  rate	  movements	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  intervene.	  I	   intend	  to	  
assess	  whether	  features	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  central	  banker	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  played	  a	  role	  in	  how	  
the	  SNB	  decided	  to	  intervene	  and,	  in	  particular,	  which	  strategies	  it	  used	  to	  manage	  the	  monetary	  dilemmas	  
that	   derive	   from	   the	   selected	   exchange	   rate	   policy.	   Thus,	   instead	   of	   denying	   the	   importance	   of	   all	   the	  
domestic	   factors	   that	   influenced	   the	  SNB’s	  policy-­‐making	  process,	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  paper	   is	   instead	   to	  
draw	  attention	  to	  an	  understudied	  aspect	  of	  the	  central	  bank’s	  exchange	  rate	  policy:	  the	  influence	  exerted	  
(and	   the	   room	   of	   maneuver	   allowed)	   by	   the	   predominant	   monetary	   paradigm	   espoused	   by	   the	  
international	  central	  banking	  community.	  	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  intervention	  is	  defined	  as	  central	  bank	  purchases	  of	  foreign	  currency	  
(against	   the	   local	   currency)	   to	   influence	   exchange	   rates.	   I	   consider	   only	   the	   practice	   of	   buying–	   and	   not	  
selling	  –	  foreign	  currency	  because	  I	  examine	  a	  case	  of	  forex	  intervention	  aimed	  at	  stemming	  appreciation	  
rather	  than	  depreciation.ii	  Finally,	  although	  the	  case	  study	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
monetary	   power	   (Kirshner,	   1995),	   this	   study	   does	   not	   investigate	   the	   multilateral	   consequences	   of	   the	  
Swiss	  forex	  intervention.	  
The	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows:	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   review	   the	   economic	   rationale	   for	   forex	  
interventions	  and	  the	  political-­‐economy	  factors	  that	  influence	  them.	  I	  will	  then	  introduce	  my	  argument	  and	  
discuss	   the	   tenets	  of	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  debate	   in	   the	   central	  banking	   community	   compared	   to	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  
monetary	   policy	   consensus.	   The	   section	   provides	   empirical	   evidence	   to	   support	   my	   arguments.	   I	   first	  
illustrate	   the	   SNB’s	   response	   to	   the	   appreciating	   Swiss	   franc,	   and	   then	   I	   deepen	  my	  analysis	   by	   showing	  
how	   the	   SNB’s	   response	   reflected	   the	   basic	   tenets	   of	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   debate	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   monetary	  
policy.	   This	   response	  will	   be	   compared	   to	   past	   Swiss	   experience	  with	   similar	  macroeconomic	   challenges	  
during	  the	  late	  1970s.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes	  by	  summarizing	  and	  reflecting	  on	  the	  findings.	  	  
	  
2.	  To	  intervene	  or	  to	  not	  intervene?	  The	  risks	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  interventions	  
	  
As	  opposed	  to	  developing	  and	  emerging	  market	  economies,	  which	  undertake	  frequent	  operations	  in	  their	  
forex	   markets	   (Adler	   and	   Tovar,	   2011),	   major	   developed	   economies	   stopped	   engaging	   in	   such	   active	  
interventions	   in	   the	   1990s	   (Bordo,	   Humpage	   and	   Schwartz,	   2012b).	   The	   evidence	   that	   intervention,	  
particularly	  sterilized	   intervention,	  was	   ineffective,	  except	   in	  the	  very	  short	  run,	  helped	  nurture	  a	  general	  
orientation	   against	   exchange	   rate	   intervention	   among	   economists	   and	   policymakers	   in	   advanced	  
economies	  (Truman,	  2003).iii	   	  
The	  opposition	  to	  the	  use	  of	  forex	  interventions	  may	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  risks	  that	  this	  policy	  
entails.	  Although	  national	  authorities	  enjoy	  more	  operational	  flexibility	  in	  addressing	  currency	  appreciation	  
than	  depreciation,iv	  official	  interventions	  to	  stem	  appreciation	  entail	  two	  main	  risks	  for	  monetary	  policy	  and	  
for	  the	  central	  bank’s	  anti-­‐inflationary	  reputation	  and	  credibility.	  	  
First,	   forex	   intervention	   risks	   expanding	   the	   domestic	   money	   supply	   and	   generating	   inflationary	  
pressures.	   Even	  when	  monetary	   authorities	   rely	   on	   sterilization	   to	   nullify	   the	   effects	   of	   intervention	   on	  
prices	   and	   interest	   rates,	   sterilization	   is	   costly	   to	   implement	   and	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   achieve	   in	   practice.v	  
Furthermore,	  in	  the	  Swiss	  case,	  the	  SNB	  has	  largely	  intervened	  through	  non-­‐sterilized	  operations	  to	  amplify	  
the	   devaluation	   effects	   of	   its	   interventions.	   An	   inevitable	   consequence	   of	   these	   operations	   has	   been	   to	  
expand	  the	  domestic	  money	  supply,	  which	  raises	  the	  specter	  of	   inflationary	  pressures	  that	  might	  damage	  
the	  export	  sector	  by	  making	  it	  less	  competitive	  internationally.vi	  
Second,	   accumulating	   forex	   reserves	   to	   depreciate	   the	   currency	   also	   poses	   risks	   to	   domestic	  
financial	  stability.	   Indeed,	  increased	  bank	  lending	  resulting	  from	  ineffective	  sterilization	  creates	  incentives	  
for	   financing	   excessive	   investment	   in	   certain	   sectors,	   such	   as	   the	   equity	   and	   property	   markets.	  
Furthermore,	  excess	  liquidity	  might	  make	  banks	  excessively	  accommodating	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  such	  credit	  
(Mohanty	   and	   Turner,	   2005:	   66).	   Excess	   liquidity	   can	   support	   booms	   in	   credit	   and	   asset	   prices	   that	   are	  
followed	   by	   collapses	   in	   those	   same	   prices	   (Moreno,	   2011).	   Official	   interventions	   can	   thus	   create	  
distortions	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  	  
In	  short,	  official	   intervention	  (particularly	  when	  sizeable	  and	  prolonged)	  risks	  weakening	  domestic	  
macroeconomic	   performance	   because	   of	   higher	   inflation	   and	   distortions	   that	   are	   introduced	   into	   the	  
financial	  system.	  These	  side	  effects	  of	  intervention,	  or	  "collateral	  damages"	  (Truman,	  2003:	  248),	  present	  a	  
serious	   threat	   for	   monetary	   authorities:	   they	   call	   into	   question	   the	   credibility	   that	   has	   been	   the	   main	  
ideological	  basis	  to	  justify	  central	  bank	  independence	  (Grabel,	  2003).	  	  
Despite	   these	   considerations,	   the	   political-­‐economy	   literature	   on	   exchange	   rate	   politics	   suggests	  
there	  are	  powerful	  political	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  decision	  to	  intervene	  to	  depreciate	  the	  exchange	  rate	  
(e.g.,	  Bearce,	  2003;	  Broz	  and	  Frieden,	  2001;	  Frieden,	  1991;	  Henning,	  1994;	  Kinderman,	  2008;	  Walter,	  2008).	  
In	   particular,	   because	   currency	   appreciation	  may	   undermine	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   tradable	   sector,	  
interest	   groups	   and	   voters	   that	   are	   the	   most	   vulnerable	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   value	   of	   the	   domestic	  
currency	   will	   demand	   depreciation.	   Export-­‐oriented	   groups	   thus	   tend	   to	   favor	   a	   depreciated	   currency.	  
Similar	   demands	   will	   be	   raised	   by	   private	   banks	   whose	   profitability	   depends	   on	   the	   international	  
competitiveness	  of	  the	  same	  export	  groups;	  the	  quality	  of	  bank	  loan	  portfolios	  could	  be	  seriously	  impaired	  
by	  corporate	   failures	  resulting	   from	  an	  overvalued	  currency	  that	  erodes	  competitiveness	  (Henning,	  1994:	  
29).	  
	   Domestic	  institutions	  can	  mitigate	  or	  intensify	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  demands	  for	  depreciation	  from	  
the	  most	  vulnerable	  actors.	  For	   instance,	  domestic	  mechanisms	  that	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  private	  sector	  
voices	  facilitate	  the	  communication	  of	  bank	  industry	  preferences	  to	  government	  officials	  (Henning,	  1994).	  
Liberalizing	   the	   capital	   account	   is	   another	   mediating	   factor	   that	   tends	   to	   exacerbate	   the	   distributional	  
impact	  of	  exchange	  rate	  movements.	  In	  particular,	  capital	  account	  openness	  has	  increased	  the	  politicization	  
of	  exchange	   rate	  policy	   (Frieden,	  1994),	   and	  polarization	  maximizes	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  demands	  of	   the	  
most	  vulnerable	  domestic	  actors.	  	  
The	  research	  reviewed	  thus	  far	  has	  revealed	  important	  factors	  that	   influence	  national	  authorities’	  
responses	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  an	  appreciating	  currency.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  academic	  
debate	   has	   been	   overly	   focused	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   preferences	   and	   actual	   decision	  making	   of	   elected	  
policymakers.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  case	  under	  investigation,	  the	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  policymakers’	  motivations	  
to	  manage	  the	  exchange	  rate	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  central	  bankers	  who	  are	  entrusted	  to	  
conduct	  exchange	  rate	  policy.vii	  
Thus,	   we	  must	   know	  more	   about	   how	   central	   bankers	   operate	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	   their	  
decisions.	   In	   this	   spirit,	   the	  paper	   shifts	   its	   attention	   to	   the	   features	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   central	   bankers’	  
decision	  making	  and,	  in	  particular,	  to	  the	  views	  that	  inform	  the	  operational	  conduct	  of	  monetary	  policy	  (c.f.	  
Widmaier,	  2007).	   In	   short,	   if	  we	  want	   to	  understand	  why	   the	  SNB	  adopted	  policies	   that	  were	  potentially	  
risky	   for	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   stability	   (and	   for	   the	   central	   bank’s	   own	   reputation),	   we	   cannot	  
focus	  solely	  on	  societal	  preferences;	  instead,	  we	  must	  consider	  how	  central	  bank	  preferences	  are	  formed.	  	  
	  
3.	  The	  transnational	  community	  of	  central	  bankers	  and	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  scope	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  
its	  tools	  
	  
Several	  studies	  in	  the	  IPE	  literature	  have	  shown	  that	  central	  bankers	  are	  aptly	  described	  as	  a	  transnational	  
epistemic	  community,	  i.e.,	  a	  knowledge-­‐based	  group	  of	  monetary	  experts	  who	  share	  common	  views	  about	  
the	  goals	  to	  which	  monetary	  policy	  should	  be	  directed	  and	  common	  views	  about	  the	  instruments	  that	  may	  
be	   employed	   to	   achieve	   these	   goals	   (McNamara,	   1998;	   Verdun,	   1999;	   Baker,	   2006;	   Marcussen,	   2006;	  
Johnson,	  2013).	  An	  important	  strand	  of	  this	   literature	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  ideas	  developed	  by	  this	  
expert	   community	   influences	   policymakers’	   decisions	   under	   specific	   conditions.	   Within	   this	   research	  
agenda,	   significant	   scholarship	   has	   also	   been	   devoted	   to	   identifying	   the	   channels	   and	  mechanisms	   that	  
enhance	   central	   bankers’	   influence	   on	   domestic	   policymakers,	   ranging	   from	   the	   management	   of	   policy	  
failures	  to	  the	  use	  of	  technical	  rationality	  (c.f.	  McNamara,	  1998;	  Abolafia,	  2012).	  	  
Another	   strand	  of	   the	   literature	  has	   focused	  on	   the	   community	  of	   central	   bankers	   itself.	   That	   is,	  
instead	  of	   focusing	  on	  how	   the	  community	  of	  experts	  has	   influenced	  a	   specific	   target	  audience,	   scholars	  
have	  focused	  on	  the	  factors	  that	  help	  explain	  the	  formation	  of	  common	  preferences	  and	  behaviors	  among	  
the	  members	  of	   the	   community.	   Examining	   the	  emergence	  of	   common	  views	   inside	   this	   community	  has	  
helped	  explain	  such	  puzzling	  outcomes	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  highly	  politically	  divisive	  international	  financial	  
agreements	  (Kapstein,	  1992)	  and	  the	  remarkable	  diffusion	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  central	  bank	  independence	  
and	  price	  stability	  (Johnson,	  2013).	  
To	  explain	  how	  such	  common	  views	  emerge	  and	  how	  they	   influence	  central	  bankers’	  operational	  
practices,	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  that	  pertain	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  context	  
of	  central	  bankers,	  including	  technicality,	  transnationality,	  and	  political	  insulation.	  	  
Technicality	   stresses	   that	   membership	   in	   the	   central	   banking	   community	   is	   defined	   more	   by	  
scientific	   knowledge	   than	  by	   territorial	  boundaries	   (Marcussen,	  2009).	   Thus,	  members	  of	   the	   community	  
share	   a	   common	   analytical	   toolkit	   through	   which	   they	   interpret	   economic	   reality	   and	   transcend	   their	  
separate	  national	  identities	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  transnational	  identity	  (also	  Baker,	  2006).	  This	  common	  knowledge	  
is,	   in	   turn,	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   repeated	   interactions	   and	   academic	   research	   on	   macroeconomic	   and	  
monetary	  policy	  that	  reinforce	  the	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  community	  of	  technical	  experts.	  As	  one	  former	  
Fed	   official	   recalled,	   in	  meetings	  with	   other	   countries’	   colleagues,	   "we	  were	   a	   rather	   like-­‐minded	   group	  
dealing	  with	  similar	  problems	  and	  trained	  in	  a	  central-­‐bank	  culture	  that	  seems	  to	  encourage	  mutual	  respect	  
for	   colleagues	  and	   took	   the	  hard	  edge	  off	   any	  aggressive	   tendencies"	   (Axilrod,	   2011:	   103).	   The	  decision-­‐
making	   context	   in	   which	   central	   bankers	   operate	   is	   also	   characterized	   by	   a	   large	   degree	   of	   political	  
insulation	   from	   domestic	   societal	   pressures.	   Over	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   this	   insulation	   has	   been	  
increasingly	   institutionalized	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   central	   bank	   operational	   independence	   in	   the	   conduct	   of	  
monetary	   policy	   has	   diffused	   throughout	   developed	   and	  developing	   countries	   alike	   (c.f.	  Maxfield,	   1997).	  
This	   context	   has	   fostered	   an	   "intimate	   level	   of	   trust	   and	   cooperation	   within	   the	   community	   of	   central	  
banks"	  (Trichet,	  2008).	  
The	   characteristics	   of	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   central	   bankers	   have	   traditionally	   operated	   are	  
particularly	  important	  to	  the	  questions	  addressed	  in	  this	  paper	  because	  they	  illuminate	  the	  development	  of	  
a	   remarkable	  degree	  of	   homogeneity	   in	   central	   banks’	   views	   and	  operational	   practices	   despite	  domestic	  
differences.	  Belonging	  to	  a	  community	   in	  which	   like-­‐mindedness	   is	   rewarded	  and	  respected	  and	   in	  which	  
members	  are	  less	  responsive	  to	  political	  pressures	  than	  other	  branches	  of	  government,	  central	  bankers	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  depart	  considerably	  from	  the	  economic	  guidelines	  that	  are	  regarded	  as	  appropriate	  by	  the	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  community.	  Regular	  and	  intensive	  interactions,	  a	  desire	  for	  reputation	  and	  esteem,	  similar	  
training,	   and	   common	   educational	   and	   professional	   backgrounds	   reinforce	   the	   influence	   of	   socialization	  
mechanisms	   over	   the	   application	   of	   coercive	   power	   because	   intra-­‐community	   interactions	   occur	   among	  
similarly	  situated	  individuals	  (Johnson,	  2013;	  Baker,	  2012).	  	  
In	  this	  idiosyncratic	  context,	  the	  views	  and	  beliefs	  common	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  community	  at	  a	  
specific	   point	   in	   time	   can	   hardly	   be	   ignored	   as	   an	   explanatory	   factor	   in	   analyses	   that	   seek	   to	   unveil	   the	  
actions	   of	   domestic	   central	   banks	   –	   particularly	   under	   crisis	   conditions	   –	   as	   acknowledged	   by	   central	  
bankers	   themselves.	   Indeed,	   the	   common	   views	   nurtured	   during	   times	   of	   normality	   "provide	   the	  
infrastructure	  to	   facilitate	  the	  prompt	   implementation	  of	  collective	  policies	   in	  periods	  of	  severe	   'financial	  
stress'"	  (Ortiz	  Martìnez,	  2009:	  296;	  also	  Trichet,	  2008).	  
	   The	   influence	  of	   shared	  beliefs	   in	   the	   central	   banking	   community	  was	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	  
conduct	   of	   monetary	   policy	   during	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period.	   As	   the	   Fed	   chairman	   Ben	   Bernanke	   (2011)	  
highlights,	   "during	   the	   two	   decades	   preceding	   the	   crisis,	   central	   bankers	   and	   academics	   achieved	   a	  
substantial	   degree	   of	   consensus	   on	   the	   intellectual	   and	   institutional	   framework	   for	   monetary	   policy".	  
Specifically,	   before	   the	   crisis	   in	   2007,	   the	   established	   view	   was	   that	   monetary	   policy	   should	   exclusively	  
target	  price	  stability	  and	  that	  price	  stability	  was	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  to	  ensure	  financial	  stability.viii	  	  
One	  of	  the	  policy	  consequences	  of	  this	  view	  is	  the	  diffusion	  of	  (variably	  flexible)	  inflation-­‐targeting	  
frameworks	   intended	   to	   induce	   policymakers	   in	   both	   developed	   and	   developing	   economies	   to	   make	  
sensible	  monetary	  policy	  decisions	   (Gòmez-­‐Mera,	  2011;	  Martìnez,	  2009:	  85).ix	  Even	  central	  banks	  that	  do	  
not	  consider	   themselves	   to	  be	  primarily	   targeting	   inflation,	  such	  as	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank	   (ECB)	  and	  
the	   Swiss	   National	   Bank,	   have	   nonetheless	   incorporated	   key	   features	   of	   this	   policy	   framework,	   which	  
includes	   a	   numerical	   definition	   of	   price	   stability,	   a	   central	   role	   for	   communications	   about	   the	   economic	  
outlook,	   and	   a	  willingness	   to	   accommodate	   short-­‐run	   economic	   stabilization	   objectives	   as	   long	   as	   these	  
objectives	  do	  not	  jeopardize	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  price	  stability	  (Issing,	  Gaspar,	  Angeloni	  and	  Tristani,	  2001;	  
Baltensperger,	  Hildebrand	  and	  Jordan,	  2007).	  
The	   pre-­‐crisis	   overwhelming	   concern	  with	   inflation	   contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   narrow	  
understanding	   of	  monetary	   policy.	   Specifically,	   it	   was	   widely	   believed	   that	   it	   was	   not	  monetary	   policy's	  
purpose	  to	  address	  potential	  asset	  bubbles	  that	  could	  destabilize	  the	  financial	  system.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  
not	  indicate	  that	  financial	  stability	  was	  not	  a	  concern	  of	  central	  banks	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  recent	  crisis.	  
However,	  the	  predominant	  view	  of	  the	  time	  was	  that	  financial	  stability	  "cannot	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  other	  
than	  broad	  and	  general	  ones	  that	  give	  little	  guidance	  on	  policy	  or	  action,	  and	  indeed	  that	  it	  could	  even	  be	  
dangerous	  so	  to	  do"	  (Davies	  and	  Green,	  2010:	  61).	  	  
This	   view	   was	   most	   evident	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   "Greenspan	   doctrine"	   named	   after	   the	   former	  
Chairman	   of	   the	   US	   Federal	   Reserve	   according	   to	   whom	   monetary	   policy	   should	   not	   "lean"	   against	   a	  
growing	  bubble,	  whether	   it	  was	   in	   the	   equity	   or	   real	   estate	  markets	   (Greenspan,	   2002).	   Thus,	  monetary	  
policy	   should	  not	  be	   influenced	  by	   financial	   stability	   considerations;	   instead,	  price	   stability	   should	  be	   the	  
focus	  of	  one	  policy	  instrument:	  the	  short-­‐term	  policy	  interest	  rate.	  	  
	   The	  recent	  crisis,	  however,	  has	  tested	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	  consensus	  and	  triggered	  
a	  lively	  debate	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  the	  instruments	  through	  which	  to	  achieve	  its	  goals.	  
Importantly,	   the	   crisis	   revealed	   that	   an	   excessively	   expansionary	   monetary	   policy	   fueled	   financial	  
instability.x	  Furthermore,	  the	  crisis	  showed	  that	  financial	  stability	  was	  not	  guaranteed	  even	  when	  monetary	  
policy	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  criterion	  of	  price	  stability)	  was	  successful.	  	  
In	   the	   climate	   of	   economic	   struggle	   encouraged	   by	   the	   crisis,	   the	   assumed	   separation	   between	  
monetary	  and	  financial	  stability	  policy	  has	  become	  the	  subject	  of	  debate	  (Davies	  and	  Green,	  2010:	  38).	  This	  
shift	  is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  public	  pronouncements	  of	  central	  bank	  officials	  in	  advanced	  economies.	  
For	   instance,	   the	  Fed	  chairman	  has	   repeatedly	  argued	   that	   central	  banks	   should	   see	   the	  maintenance	  of	  
financial	  stability	  as	  coequal	  with	  their	  responsibilities	  for	  the	  management	  of	  monetary	  policy	  (Bernanke,	  
2013,	  2011),	  a	  point	  that	  has	  been	  echoed	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  Supervision,	  
who	  has	  posited,	   "the	   financial	   crisis	  has	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   the	  monetary	  policy	   framework	  needs	   to	  be	  
developed	   so	   that	   it	   takes	   greater	   account	  of	   the	   importance	  of	   financial	   stability.	  …	   and	   that	  monetary	  
policy	   and	   financial	   stability	   policy	  must	   be	   coordinated	   to	   an	   even	   greater	   extent	   than	   before"	   (Ingves,	  
2013).	  
The	  increased	  attention	  to	  financial	  stability	  as	  part	  of	  the	  central	  bank’s	  monetary	  mandate	  is	  well	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  IMF	  conference	  on	  rethinking	  global	  macroeconomic	  policy	  that	  convened	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  
2013.xi	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   underlying	   questions	   of	   the	   conference	  was	   how	   central	   bankers	   can	   be	   sure	  
they	  are	  not	  "running	  the	  risk	  of	  reigniting	  the	  problems	  that	  led	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  the	  first	  place",	  in	  
the	   words	   Charlie	   Bean,	   deputy	   Bank	   of	   England	   governor	   (as	   reported	   in	   the	   Financial	   Times,	   Central	  
bankers	  say	  they	  are	  flying	  blind,	  17	  April	  2013).	  Central	  bankers	  thus	  have	  debated	  the	  validity	  of	  pre-­‐crisis	  
monetary	  policy	  targets	  and	  instruments.	  Although	  no	  member	  of	  the	  central	  banking	  community	  called	  for	  
a	   complete	   rejection	   of	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   conventional	   wisdom,	   it	   was	   repeatedly	   noted	   that	   the	   inflation-­‐
targeting	   framework	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   monetary	   policy	   approach	   that	   is	   capable	   of	   addressing	   both	  
macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   challenges	   (Bini	   Smaghi,	   2013).	   Furthermore,	   it	   was	   widely	   acknowledged	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  lessons	  of	  the	  crisis	  is	  that	  a	  monetary	  policy	  that	  is	  exclusively	  focused	  on	  
achieving	   long-­‐run	   price	   stability	   raises	   questions	   about	   how	   central	   banks	   can	   effectively	   meet	   their	  
overall	  macroeconomic	  objectives.	  In	  particular,	  the	  crisis	  has	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  how	  a	  central	  bank	  can	  
manage	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  keeping	  output	   in	   line	  with	  potential	  output	  and	   inflation	  on	  target	   in	  the	  
near	  term	  (i.e.,	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	  policy	  objective)	  and	  ensuring	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  
in	  the	  medium	  term	  (King,	  2013).	  	  
In	   short,	   although	   this	  debate	  does	  not	   suggest	   that	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  monetary	   consensus	  has	  been	  
abandoned,	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  awareness	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  central	  banking	  
community	   that	   their	  policies	  should	  simultaneously	  secure	  monetary	  and	   financial	   stability.xii	   Even	   those	  
central	  bankers	   that	  continue	  to	  adhere	  to	   the	  view	  that	  a	  central	  bank	  has	  no	   instruments	   for	   targeting	  
asset	  prices	  have	  admitted	  that	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  consensus	  "has	  a	  problem"	  and	  that	  restricting	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
central	  bank	  to	  be	  completely	  passive	  during	  the	  expansion	  of	  a	  bubble	  represents	  an	  asymmetric	  approach	  
that	  could	  lead	  to	  moral	  hazard	  problems	  (Issing,	  2011,	  6;	  also	  King,	  2012).	  	  
In	   spite	   of	   the	   largely	   accepted	   principle	   that	   financial	   stability	   should	   complement	   monetary	  
stability	   as	   a	   goal	   that	   the	   central	   bank	   pursues,	   a	  more	   controversial	   issue	   in	   the	   current	   debate	   is	   to	  
determine	  which	  policy	  instruments	  –	  in	  addition	  to	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  –	  central	  banks	  can	  deploy	  to	  
"lean"	  against	  the	  wind	  of	  asset	  price	  booms.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  vocal	  actors	  in	  this	  debate	  has	  been	  the	  Bank	  
for	  International	  Settlements	  (BIS)	  –	  also	  known	  as	  the	  central	  bankers’	  bank.	  Well	  before	  the	  crisis,	  the	  BIS	  
advocated	  measures	  to	  counter	  the	  risks	  that	  were	  amassing	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  (Borio	  and	  White,	  2004;	  
Borio,	  Furfine	  and	  Lowe,	  2001;	  for	  an	  overview	  see	  Baker,	  2012).xiii	  In	  particular,	  the	  BIS	  has	  suggested	  that	  
increased	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  devoted	  to	  the	  tools	   that	  may	  supplement	  the	  traditional	  policy	   interest	  
rate	   by	   addressing	   the	   pro-­‐cyclical	   dynamics	   of	   the	   credit	   market	   and	   strengthening	   financial	   resilience	  
(Committee	   on	   the	   Global	   Financial	   System,	   2010;	   Financial	   Stability	   Board,	   Bank	   for	   International	  
Settlements	  and	   International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  2011;	  White,	  2009).	  These	  tools,	  which	  are	  categorized	  as	  
MPR	   measures,	   include	   primarily	   prudential	   tools	   that	   are	   designed	   to	   target	   one	   or	   more	   sources	   of	  
systemic	  risk,	  such	  as	  excessive	  leverage	  in	  the	  financial	  sector,	  liquidity	  mismatches,	  excessive	  reliance	  on	  
short-­‐term	  funding,	  and	  interconnectedness.	  	  
After	   the	   crisis,	   the	   policy	   tools	   advocated	   by	   the	   BIS	   have	   become	   a	   buzzword	   in	   international	  
regulatory	  circles	   leading	  the	  Director	  of	  Research	  at	  the	  BIS	  to	  note	  that	   ‘We	  are	  all	  Macroprudentialists	  
now’	  (as	  quoted	  in	  Baker,	  2012,	  118).	  In	  particular,	  MPR	  tools	  have	  started	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  "the	  first	  lines	  
of	   defense	  …	   to	  mitigate	   the	   risk	   of	   financial	   excesses",	   to	   use	   the	  words	  of	   the	   former	  Bank	  of	   Canada	  
Governor	  (Carney	  2013),	  or	  as	  tools	  that	  effectively	  address	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  single	   instrument	  of	  
the	  short-­‐term	  policy	  interest	  rate,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  the	  former	  ECB	  Vice	  President	  (Papademos	  2009).	  This	  
argument	  has	  also	  been	  forcefully	  supported	  by	  the	   former	  Chairman	  of	   the	  SNB,	  Philip	  Hildebrand,	  who	  
has	  been	  a	  supporter	  of	  a	  tougher	  capital	  and	  leverage	  ratio	  (Tom	  Braithwaite	  and	  Patrick	  Jenkins,	  Finance:	  
Balance	  sheet	  battle,	  Financial	  Times,	  14	  August	  2013).	  The	   international	  central	  banking	  community	  has	  
also	  institutionalized	  some	  of	  these	  MPR	  measures	  into	  formal	  rules	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  guide	  the	  conduct	  
of	  domestic	  monetary	  authorities.	  Specifically,	  countercyclical	  capital	  buffers	  (CCB)	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  
2010-­‐11	   reformed	   international	   regulatory	   framework	   for	   banks	   (known	   as	   the	   Basel	   III	   Accord).	   These	  
measures	   have	   been	   repeatedly	   described	   as	   strong	   examples	   of	   a	  MPR	   approach	   (Basel	   Committee	   on	  
Banking	  Supervision,	  2010).	  
In	  short,	  after	  the	  crisis,	  the	  division	  between	  monetary	  and	  financial	  stability	  has	  been	  blurred.	  In	  
particular,	  it	  has	  become	  increasingly	  common	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  monetary	  policy	  beyond	  price	  stability.	  The	  
conception	   of	   an	   appropriate	   monetary	   policy	   toolkit	   has	   also	   been	   expanded	   by	   according	   increased	  
consideration	   to	  MPR	   instruments	   that	  may	   help	   counter	   the	   systemic	   challenges	   of	   financial	   instability.	  
This	  emerging	  and	  new	  understanding	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  its	  tools	  has	  been	  reflected	  in	  
the	   SNB’s	   decision	  making,	  which	   has	   rendered	   it	   particularly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   risks	   of	   domestic	   financial	  
stability	  that	  derive	  from	  its	  exchange	  rate	  choices.	  In	  a	  context	  in	  which	  short-­‐term	  policy	  interest	  rate	  was	  
no	   longer	  an	  available	  policy	  option,	   the	  emerging	  view	  of	  monetary	  policy	  also	  offered	  the	  central	  bank	  
the	  policy	   space	   to	  experiment	  new	  policy	   instruments	   through	  which	   to	  mitigate	   the	  potential	  negative	  
consequences	  deriving	   from	   its	   response	   to	   the	  appreciating	  Swiss	   franc,	   as	   is	  discussed	   in	   the	   following	  
sections.	  
	  
4.	  Resisting	  appreciation:	  the	  SNB’s	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  
	  
4.1	  Foreign	  exchange	  interventions	  and	  pegged	  exchange	  rates	  
	  
The	   SNB,	   as	   the	   central	   bank	   of	   Switzerland,	   has	   a	   statutory	  mandate	   to	   pursue	   a	  monetary	   policy	   that	  
serves	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole.	   This	   mandate	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Constitution	   and	   the	  
National	   Bank	   Act	   (NBA).	   The	  NBA	   (article	   5	   paragraph	   1)	   clarifies	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SNB’s	  mandate	   and	  
specifies	  that	  the	  SNB	  "shall	  ensure	  price	  stability".	  When	  ensuring	  price	  stability,	  the	  SNB	  "shall	  take	  due	  
account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  economy".	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  enshrined	  in	  the	  NBA,	  the	  requirement	  
to	  ensure	  price	  stability	  has	  been	  further	  specified	  in	  the	  SNB’s	  monetary	  policy	  strategy,	  which	  has	  been	  in	  
force	   since	   2000.	   The	   SNB	   equates	   price	   stability	  with	   a	   rise	   (or	   decline)	   in	   the	   national	   consumer	   price	  
index	  of	   less	   than	  2%	  per	  year	   (Swiss	  National	  Bank,	  2012b).xiv	   The	   responsibility	  of	   setting	   the	  exchange	  
rate	  of	  the	  domestic	  currency	  is	  also	  a	  responsibility	  of	  the	  SNB.xv	  Even	  though	  in	  several	  countries,	  central	  
banks	  have	  only	  shared	  or	  partial	  responsibility	  over	  the	  exchange	  rate	  (most	  notably	  in	  the	  United	  States),	  
the	  SNB	  has	  almost	  full	  responsibility	  in	  Switzerland	  (Archer	  and	  Bingham,	  2009:	  31).	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	  monetary	   function,	   the	   National	   Bank	   Act	   also	   gives	   the	   SNB	   the	  mandate	   to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  The	  SNB	  performs	  this	  task	  by	  analyzing	  sources	  of	  risk	  to	  
the	  financial	  system,	  by	  overseeing	  systemically	  important	  payment	  and	  securities	  settlement	  systems,	  and	  
by	  helping	  to	  shape	  the	  operational	  framework	  for	  the	  Swiss	  financial	  sector.xvi	  
It	   is	   notable	   that	   the	   SNB	   had	   not	   intervened	   in	   the	   forex	  market	   to	   stabilize	   the	   exchange	   rate	  
since	  August	  1995	  (Bordo,	  Humpage	  and	  Schwartz,	  2012b).	  Specifically,	  between	  the	  early	  1980s	  and	  2009,	  
the	  SNB’s	  interventions	  on	  the	  forex	  market	  were	  extremely	  rare.	  Generally	  speaking,	  such	  actions	  involved	  
very	  small	  amounts	  of	  currency	  as	  part	  of	  coordinated	  interventions	  by	  the	  central	  banks	  of	  the	  Group	  of	  
Ten	  countries	  (Jordan,	  2012)	  
This	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  was	  drastically	  reversed	  in	  March	  2009	  when,	  following	  the	  escalation	  of	  
the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  capital	  rushed	  into	  Switzerland	  and	  pushed	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Swiss	  
franc	  to	  an	  all-­‐time	  high	  of	  approximately	  CHF	  1.46	  per	  euro.	  At	  that	   juncture,	  the	  SNB	  switched	  to	  more	  
active	  management	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate	  to	  counter	  its	  appreciation	  (Swiss	  National	  Bank,	  12	  March	  2009).	  
Specifically,	  with	   short-­‐term	   interest	   rates	  already	   reduced	   to	  practically	   zero,	   the	  SNB	  began	  purchasing	  
foreign	  currency	  to	  stem	  the	  upward	  pressures	  on	  the	  Swiss	  franc	  and	  to	  prevent	  undesirable	  deflationary	  
developments.	  The	  SNB’s	  substantial	  forex	  purchases	  were	  not	  sterilized,	  at	  least	  not	  until	  April	  2009	  (also	  
Bordo,	   Humpage	   and	   Schwartz,	   2012a;	   IMF,	   2012a).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Swiss	  monetary	   base	   increased	   by	  
more	   than	   the	   value	   of	   the	   foreign	   assets	   on	   the	   SNB’s	   balance	   sheet,	   which	   allowed	   for	   significant	  
currency	  depreciation.xvii	  	  
The	   foreign	   currency	   purchases	  were	   suspended	   in	   June	   2010.	  However,	   the	   appreciation	   of	   the	  
Swiss	   franc	  accelerated	  during	   the	   last	  half	  of	   that	  year	  and	  continued	   throughout	  2011.	  Specifically,	   the	  
CHF/euro	  rate	  increased	  from	  1.6	  in	  late	  2007	  to	  almost	  parity	  in	  early	  August	  2011,	  with	  a	  cumulative	  real	  
effective	   appreciation	   of	   over	   30%	   (IMF,	   2012c:	   5).	   Given	   the	   continued	   upward	   pressures	   on	   the	   Swiss	  
franc,	   the	   SNB	   ultimately	   decided	   to	   intervene	   by	   setting	   an	   explicit	   floor	   on	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	  
abandoning	   the	   floating	   exchange	   rate	   regime.	   Indeed,	   on	   6	   September	   2011,	   the	   SNB	   set	   a	   minimum	  
exchange	  rate	  of	  CHF	  1.20	  against	  the	  euro	  by	  announcing	  that	  it	  was	  prepared	  to	  buy	  foreign	  currency	  in	  
unlimited	  quantities	  to	  enforce	  this	  minimum	  rate.xviii	  	  
The	   accumulation	   of	   forex	   reserves	   to	   stem	   Swiss	   franc	   appreciation	   and	   to	   defend	   the	   newly	  
introduced	  floor	  has	  resulted	   in	  a	  dramatic	  expansion	  of	  the	  SNB	  balance	  sheet.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  December	  
2012,	   the	   SNB	  had	  accumulated	  CHF427bn	   ($457bn)	   in	  overseas	   currencies,	   the	   fifth	   largest	   stockpile	  of	  
foreign	  currency	  reserves	  in	  the	  world	  (Financial	  Times,	  Investors	  dump	  Swiss	  franc	  as	  euro	  rises,	  by	  Alice	  
Ross,	   17	   January	   2013).	   The	   heavy	   inflows	   from	   the	   SNB’s	   forex	   operations	   had	   not	   gone	   noticed.	   The	  
remarks	  of	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Australia	  are	  telling;	  expressing	  his	  own	  discomfort	  with	  his	  
domestic	  currency’s	  strength,	  Governor	  Glenn	  Stevens,	  referring	  to	  the	  SNB,	  commented:	  "I	  never	  thought	  I	  
would	  ever	   see	   such	  an	  anti-­‐inflationary,	   conservative	   institution	  as	   that	  hold	  our	   currency	  as	  part	  of	   its	  
reserves".xix	  Let	  us	  then	  try	  to	  understand	  how	  an	  anti-­‐inflationary,	  conservative	  central	  bank	  managed	  the	  
macroeconomic	   and	   reputational	   risks	   deriving	   from	   its	   exchange	   rate	   policy	   and	   the	   attendant	   loss	   of	  
control	  over	  monetary	  policy.	  
	  
4.2	  Putting	  the	  SNB’s	  response	  in	  context:	  domestic	  societal	  pressures	  and	  central	  banking	  monetary	  policy	  
consensus	  
	  
Although	   the	   SNB’s	   accumulation	   of	   forex	   reserves	   might	   be	   interpreted	   as	   part	   of	   the	   central	   bank’s	  
investment	  policy,	  the	  SNB	  has	  strongly	  and	  repeatedly	  affirmed	  that	  its	  balance	  sheet	  expansion	  is	  nothing	  
but	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  its	  monetary	  policy	  decisions.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  decision	  to	  intervene	  to	  weaken	  
the	   currency	   was	   part	   of	   the	   central	   bank	  monetary	   policy	   to	   address	   deflationary	   risk	   (SNB	   10	   August	  
2011;	  6	  September	  2011;	  Zurbrügg,	  2012b).	  	  
Given	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   Swiss	   capitalist	   economy,	   it	   is	   not	  particularly	   surprising	   that	   the	  
central	   bank’s	   active	   approach	   to	  weaken	   the	   exchange	   rate	  was	   supported	   by	   domestic	   audiences	   (c.f.	  
Fioretos,	  2010).	  As	  a	  small,	  open	  economy	  with	  few	  natural	  resources	  and	  a	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  trade,	  
the	   exchange	   rate	   is	   particularly	   important	   for	   Switzerland.	   Only	   a	   few	   multinationals,	   such	   as	  
pharmaceutical	   and	   electrical	   equipment	   companies	   (such	   as	   Novartis	   and	   ABB),	   have	   the	   flexibility	   to	  
transfer	   production	   to	   factories	   in	   different	   currency	   zones.	   Most	   Swiss	   companies	   do	   not	   have	   such	  
flexibility	   (Financial	   Times,	   Business	   warns	   strong	   franc	   remains	   threat,	   by	   Haig	   Simonian,	   6	   September	  
2011).	  
Support	   for	   the	   central	   bank’s	   decisions	   came	   primarily	   from	   business	   associations,	   such	   as	   the	  
Swiss	   Business	   Federation	   (Economiesuisse)	   and	   the	   Association	   of	   Small	   and	   Medium	   Enterprises.	   For	  
instance,	  in	  a	  press	  release	  from	  early	  December	  2012,	  Economiesuisse	  hailed	  the	  SNB’s	  protection	  of	  the	  
minimum	  exchange	  rate	  with	  the	  euro	  as	  "an	  important	  support	  mechanism	  which	  in	  the	  current	  situation	  
should	  under	  no	  circumstances	  be	  discontinued",	  although	  the	  business	  association	  continued	  to	  consider	  
the	  selected	  exchange	  rate	  to	  be	  overvalued	  (Economiesuisse,	  2012).	  In	  addition	  to	  business	  associations,	  
support	  for	  the	  central	  bank’s	  active	  approach	  to	  exchange	  rate	  management	  came	  from	  parties	  across	  the	  
political	   spectrum.	   For	   instance,	   both	   the	   center-­‐left	   Social	   Democrats	   and	   the	   center-­‐right	   Christian	  
Democrats	  backed	  the	  central	  bank’s	  decision	  to	  set	  a	  threshold	  in	  the	  Swiss	  franc’s	  exchange	  rate	  to	  ease	  
the	  burden	  on	  Switzerland’s	  export	   industry.	  The	  center-­‐right	  Radical	  Party,	  which	  is	  traditionally	  close	  to	  
the	  business	  community,	  also	  declared	  its	  confidence	  in	  the	  SNB.	  Even	  the	  right-­‐wing	  Swiss	  People’s	  Party,	  
which	  initially	  strongly	  criticized	  the	  SNB,	  eventually	  stood	  behind	  the	  decision.xx	  	  
By	   contrast	   to	   the	   explicit	   support	   expressed	   for	   the	   SNB’s	   exchange	   rate	   management,	   the	  
opposition	  to	  a	  weakened	  currency	  was	  muted.	  One	  would	  have	  expected	  international	  investors,	  such	  as	  
Swiss	  private	  banks,	  to	  favor	  a	  stronger	  currency	  to	  purchase	  overseas	  assets	  more	  cheaply	  (Frieden,	  1994:	  
85).	  However,	  during	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  principal	  Swiss	  banks	  suffered	  severe	  losses,	  and	  their	  
activities	  were	  severely	  criticized	  in	  both	  public	  and	  political	  debates.	  For	  instance,	  UBS	  lost	  $38bn	  on	  credit	  
derivatives	  in	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  (Financial	  Times,	  UBS	  Chief	  calls	  on	  "arrogant"	  bankers	  to	  change,	  by	  
Patrick	   Jenkins	  and	  Lina	  Saigol,	  10	   January	  2013,	  print	  edition)	  and	  has	  since	  been	   involved	   in	  a	  string	  of	  
scandals	  including	  the	  rigging	  of	  Libor	  interest	  rates.	  	  
The	   configuration	   of	   domestic	   preferences	   favoring	   a	   weakened	   Swiss	   franc	   has	   certainly	  
emboldened	   the	   SNB’s	   response	   to	   the	   appreciating	   Swiss	   franc.	  Domestic	   factors	   are	   also	   important	   to	  
take	  into	  account	  when	  determining	  why	  other	  policy	  options	  were	  not	  considered.	  For	  instance,	   interest	  
rates	   had	   previously	   been	   lowered	   to	   the	   zero	   bound	   to	   support	   the	   domestic	   economy,	   and	   the	  
constitutional	  debt	  brake	  rule	  ("Schuldenbremse")	  adopted	  in	  2002	  constrained	  the	  country’s	  fiscal	  policy	  
response.	  Other	  policy	  options,	   such	  as	   capital	   controls,	  were	   also	   ruled	  out	  because	  of	   the	   state	  of	   the	  
domestic	  economy.	  Specifically,	  controls	  "would	  likely	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  enforce	  given	  the	  sophisticated	  
financial	  sector,	  and	  would	  have	  hurt	  Switzerland’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  global	  financial	  center"	  (IMF,	  2012a:	  6).	  
Despite	   the	   importance	   of	   domestic	   factors	   in	   the	   exchange	   rate	   decision	   making,	   an	   exclusive	  
focus	  on	  these	  factors	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  explain	  the	  SNB’s	  actions.	  In	  particular,	  domestic	  distributional	  
considerations	   cannot	   explain	  why	   a	   conservative	   central	   bank	   opted	   for	   policies	   that	   entailed	   a	   loss	   of	  
control	  over	  its	  monetary	  policy	  and	  significant	  risk	  to	  its	  reputation	  and	  credibility,	  which	  in	  Switzerland	  is	  
regarded	  as	   the	  SNB’s	   "most	   important	   capital	  –	   a	   capital	   that	   it	   is	   loathe	   to	  put	  at	   risk"	   (Baltensperger,	  
Hildebrand	  and	  Jordan,	  2007:	  20).	  Furthermore,	  maintaining	  an	  anti-­‐inflationary	  reputation	  was	  extremely	  
important	  for	  a	  country	  in	  which	  the	  financial	  sector	  accounted	  for	  approximately	  11.6%	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  
pre-­‐crisis	  period	  (Swiss	  Bankers	  Association,	  2010:	  13).xxi	  	  
In	   light	   of	   these	   considerations,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   another	   set	   of	   factors,	   in	   addition	   to	  
those	   regarding	   the	   domestic	   distributional	   impact	   of	   exchange	   rate	   movements.	   Indeed,	   the	   policy	  
strategy	  that	  the	  SNB	  followed	  to	  mitigate	  the	  risks	  of	  its	  monetary	  and	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  goals	  strongly	  
reflect	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	   emerging	   post-­‐crisis	   monetary	   consensus	   in	   the	   international	   central	   banking	  
community.	   The	   SNB	   was	   particularly	   aware	   of	   the	   financial	   stability	   implications	   deriving	   from	   its	  
monetary	  policy	  and	  utilized	  MPR	  tools	  to	  solve	  the	  monetary	  dilemma	  posed	  by	  the	  exchange	  rate	  policy.	  	  
The	   first	   indications	   that	   financial	   stability	  was	   figuring	  prominently	   in	   the	  SNB’s	  decision	  making	  
(alongside	  its	  traditional	  concern	  with	  price	  stability)	  could	  be	  detected	  in	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  key	  SNB	  
officials	  who	  invoked	  the	  lessons	  learned	  at	  the	  international	  level	  to	  justify	  domestic	  policy	  choices.	  In	  the	  
words	   of	   Pierre	   Danthine	   (2012),	   one	   of	   the	   three	   members	   of	   the	   SNB	   Governing	   Board,	   "the	   dismal	  
consequences	  of	  the	  recent	  global	  crisis	  …	  are	  stark	  reminders	  that	  we	  should	  …	  ensure	  that	  a	  similar	  crisis	  
does	  not	  materialize	   in	  our	  country	  again".	  Consistent	  with	   the	  emerging	   international	  monetary	  debate,	  
Swiss	   authorities	   forcefully	   argued	   that	   it	  was	   their	   responsibility	   to	   act	   not	   solely	   because	   of	  monetary	  
developments	   (i.e.,	   deflationary	   risks)	   but	   also	   because	   of	   financial	   sector	   developments.	   The	  
developments	   in	   the	  mortgage	   and	   real	   estate	   markets	   were	   regarded	   as	   particularly	   worrisome.	   From	  
2009	   to	   2012,	   yearly	   growth	   rates	   of	   mortgage	   lending	   and	   real	   estate	   prices	   were	   approximately	   5%,	  
which	  is	  well	  above	  the	  average	  economic	  growth	  observed	  during	  recent	  years.	  The	  mortgage-­‐lending-­‐to-­‐
GDP	  ratio	  had	  also	  reached	  historical	  heights	  (also	  IMF,	  2012a:	  6).	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  monetary	  expansion	  
associated	  with	  the	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  of	  depreciating	  the	  Swiss	   franc	   increased	  the	  risks	  of	  bubbles	   in	  
housing	   and	   equity	   markets,	   leading	   Fitz	   Zurbrügg,	   another	   member	   of	   the	   SNB’s	   governing	   board,	   to	  
declare	  publicly	   that	   the	  SNB	  was	  seriously	  worried	  about	  developments	   in	   the	  domestic	  housing	  market	  
compounded	  by	  the	  fight	  against	  overvaluation	  (as	  reported	  in	  Financial	  Times,	  Swiss	  banks	  on	  alert	  amid	  
property	  boom,	  by	  James	  Shotter,	  29	  January	  2013).	  
In	   addition	   to	   directing	   Swiss	   monetary	   authorities’	   attention	   toward	   the	   risks	   in	   the	   financial	  
sector,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  international	  debate	  on	  the	  SNB’s	  choices	  can	  also	  be	  detected	  in	  the	  
domestic	  discussion	  of	   the	  most	  appropriate	  monetary	  policy	  tools	   to	  manage	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  
exchange	  rate	  and	  the	  health	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  In	  particular,	  the	  echo	  of	  the	  international	  debate	  on	  
the	  need	  to	  expand	  the	  central	  bankers’	  toolkit	  beyond	  the	  short-­‐term	  policy	  interest	  rate	  can	  be	  detected	  
in	   the	   public	   stance	   of	   SNB	   officials.	   For	   instance,	   Danthine	   publicly	   questioned	   the	   almost	   exclusive	  
reliance	   on	   the	   interest	   rate	   instrument	   (as	   was	   the	   case	   during	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period)	   by	   the	   SNB	   to	  
effectively	   perform	   its	   functions.	   In	   particular,	   Danthine	   (2012a)	   noted	   that	   there	  may	   be	   circumstances	  
when	  using	  the	  interest	  rate	  to	  contain	  asset	  price	  may	  "lead	  to	  deviations	  from	  the	  interest	  rate	  path	  that	  
would	   be	   optimally	   justified	   by	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   price	   stability	   mandate".	   These	   circumstances	   are	  
embodied	   by	   the	   Swiss	   situation	   in	   which	   the	   exchange	   rate	   policy	   invalidates	   the	   interest	   rate	   as	   an	  
available	  instrument	  for	  SNB’s	  monetary	  purposes.	  	  
	   The	   central	   bank’s	   concerns	  with	   the	  use	  of	   the	   short-­‐term	  policy	   rate	   to	   address	  monetary	   and	  
financial	  imbalances	  are	  not	  merely	  theoretical;	  reflecting	  the	  policy	  space	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  unraveling	  of	  
the	   pre-­‐crisis	   monetary	   debate	   in	   central	   banking	   circles,	   the	   SNB	   started	   experimenting	   a	   number	   of	  
supplementary	  MPR	  measures.	   In	   a	   lecture	   taking	   stock	   of	   the	  monetary	   lessons	   of	   the	   crisis,	   Danthine	  
(2012b)	  elaborated	  the	  thinking	  behind	  SNB	  operational	  practices.	   In	  particular,	  because	  "the	   impact	  of	  a	  
high	  interest	  rate	  policy	  on	  the	  exchange	  rate	  would	  surely	  increase	  the	  associated	  output	  loss",	  he	  noted	  
that	   "it	   is	   therefore	   crucial	   that	   the	   Swiss	   authorities	   implement	   the	   most	   cost-­‐effective	   measures	   to	  
counter	   the	   financial	   excesses	   which	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   crisis".	   The	   measures	   Danthine	   refers	   to	   are	   MPR	  
measures.	  
The	  MPR	  measures	  adopted	  in	  Switzerland	  were	  designed	  to	  provide	  monetary	  authorities	  with	  the	  
flexibility	  to	  counter	  adverse	  developments	  in	  the	  domestic	  credit	  market	  and	  increase	  the	  "loss-­‐absorbing	  
capacity"	   of	   the	   domestic	   banking	   sector	   (Swiss	   National	   Bank,	   2012a).	   To	   achieve	   these	   goals,	  
countercyclical	  capital	  buffers	  were	  adopted	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  policy	  tool	  which,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  is	  now	  largely	  
regarded	   as	   one	   of	   the	   strongest	   bulwarks	   against	   procyclical	   financial	   developments	   and	   have	   been	  
institutionalized	  into	  the	  Basel	  III	  rules.	  However,	  whereas	  the	  Basel	  rules	  will	  become	  fully	  effective	  only	  in	  
2019,	  Switzerland	  adopted	  them	  in	  June	  2012.xxii	  	  
Financial	  stability	  considerations	  also	  figured	  prominently	  in	  the	  SNB	  justification	  for	  the	  adoption	  
of	  CCBs,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  international	  monetary	  debate.	  In	  particular,	  
the	   SNB	   appealed	   to	   concerns	   about	   the	   risks	   of	   cyclical	   imbalances	   that	   were	   evident	   in	   the	   domestic	  
mortgage	  and	  real	  estate	  markets	  (Swiss	  National	  Bank,	  2012a).	  The	  persistently	  low	  interest	  rate	  (which,	  
as	   previously	   noted,	   is	   an	   indispensable	   part	   of	   the	   central	   bank’s	   exchange	   rate	   policy)	  was	   also	   a	   key	  
factor	   behind	   the	   adoption	   of	   CCBs.xxiii	   Given	   the	   commitment	   to	   the	   minimum	   exchange	   rate,	   the	  
Chairman	  of	  the	  SNB	  Governing	  Board	  argued	  that	  "possible	  distortions	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  credit	  aggregates	  
that	   could	   endanger	   financial	   stability	   should	   be	  managed,	   first	   and	   foremost,	  with	   the	  macroprudential	  
toolkit"	  (Jordan,	  2012).	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  consensus	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  SNB	  preferences	  can	  also	  
be	   illustrated	  by	  comparing	  the	  current	  Swiss	  situation	  with	  a	  similar	  historical	  experience.	   Indeed,	  this	   is	  
not	  the	  first	   time	  the	  SNB	  has	  decided	  to	  weaken	  the	  domestic	  currency.	   In	   fact,	   the	  exchange	  rate	  floor	  
announced	  in	  2011	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  return	  to	  the	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  the	  SNB	  in	  1978	  to	  prevent	  the	  
appreciation	  of	  the	  CHF.	  	  
In	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   the	  SNB	  had	  also	  become	   increasingly	  concerned	  about	   the	   level	  and	  speed	  of	  
domestic	  currency	  appreciation.xxiv	  The	  central	  bank	  reacted	  by	  undertaking	  repeated	  interventions	  in	  the	  
forex	   market.	   Restrictions	   on	   inflows	   of	   foreign	   capital	   were	   also	   introduced.	   Despite	   these	   measures,	  
however,	   upward	   pressures	   on	   the	   exchange	   rate	   continued.	   Indeed	   –	   as	   in	   2011	   –	   short-­‐term	   interest	  
rates	  were	  previously	  set	  very	  low,	  and	  the	  SNB	  had	  little	  room	  for	  additional	  decreases	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
deflationary	  threat.	  In	  October	  1978,	  the	  SNB	  introduced	  a	  floor	  on	  the	  exchange	  rate	  of	  the	  deutschmark	  
with	   the	  Swiss	   franc.	  To	  defend	   the	  new	  exchange	   rate	  peg,	   the	  SNB	  was	  compelled	   to	  purchase	   foreign	  
exchange	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  and	  to	  expand	  the	  monetary	  base.xxv	  	  
By	  contrast	  to	  current	  events,	  however,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  SNB	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  was	  
mainly	  assessed	  in	  light	  of	  its	  consequences	  for	  monetary	  policy,	  which	  was	  almost	  exclusively	  conceived	  of	  
as	  a	  policy	  for	  achieving	  price	  stability	  (Peytrignet,	  1999).	  xxvi	  Following	  the	  surge	  in	  the	  monetary	  base	  from	  
the	  official	  purchases	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  required	  to	  halt	  the	  appreciation	  of	  the	  Swiss	  franc,	  "the	  SNB	  was	  
well	  aware	  that	  the	  temporary	  surge	  in	  the	  monetary	  base	  might	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  new	  spurt	  of	  inflation"	  
(Kohli	  and	  Rich,	  1986:	  923).	  
Inflation	  concerns	  were	  of	  course	  extremely	  real	   in	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  time.	  While	  the	  
Swiss	   franc	   depreciated	   by	   5%	   one	   month	   after	   the	   floor	   was	   introduced	   and	   continued	   to	   weaken	  
afterwards,	   inflation	  spiked	  from	  less	  than	  1%	  to	  5%	  annually,	  peaking	  at	  approximately	  7%	  in	  1981	  after	  
the	  1979	  oil	  shock	  (IMF,	  2012a:	  3).	  	  
However,	   these	   developments	   were	   consistent	   with	   the	   prevalent	   international	   monetary	  
consensus	  of	  the	  time,	  which	  might	  be	  summarized	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  monetarism,	  that	  is,	  the	  view	  that	  
inflation	   is	   primarily	   a	   monetary	   phenomenon,	   that	   low	   and	   stable	   inflation	   has	   priority	   over	   other	  
macroeconomic	   objectives,	   and	   that	   the	   main	   task	   of	   monetary	   authorities	   is	   to	   eliminate	   inflation	   by	  
directly	  addressing	  its	  source	  –	  growth	  in	  the	  money	  supply.	  To	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  a	  new	  policy	  framework	  
that	   explicitly	   targeted	   the	   rate	  of	  money	  growth	   to	   stem	   inflationary	  expectations	  became	   the	   focus	  of	  
increasing	  attention	   in	   international	  central	  banking	  circles	   (Axilrod,	  2011,	  p.	  103-­‐05).	   It	   is	  not	   feasible	   to	  
trace	  how	  this	  peculiar	  understanding	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  the	  attendant	  monetary	  framework	  gained	  
the	   upper	   hand	   in	   the	   international	   debate	   in	   this	   paper;	   however,	   this	   view	   diffused	   well	   beyond	   the	  
United	  States	  (where	  it	  was	  introduced	  under	  Fed	  chairman	  Volcker),	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  an	  anti-­‐inflationary	  
path	  became	  the	  foundation	  of	  central	  bank	  independence	  around	  the	  world.xxvii	  	  	  
In	   this	   context,	   although	   the	   SNB	   hoped	   that	   it	   could	   stabilize	   the	   exchange	   rate	   without	  
jeopardizing	   price	   stability,	   it	   eventually	   prioritized	   the	   latter	   over	   the	   goal	   of	   defending	   the	   peg	   and	  
resumed	  monetary	  targeting	  in	  1979.	  Adherence	  to	  the	  contemporary	  consensus	  is	  explicit,	  for	  example,	  in	  
the	   positions	   expressed	   by	   Fritz	   Leutwiler,	   President	   of	   the	   SNB	   from	   1974	   to	   1985,	   who	   came	   to	   the	  
conclusion	  that	  "central	  banks	  straying	  from	  the	  path	  of	  virtue	  sooner	  or	  later	  would	  be	  punished	  by	  a	  jump	  
in	  the	  inflation	  rate"	  (in	  Kugler	  and	  Rich,	  2001:	  9).	  
As	   is	   the	  case	  today,	   in	  1978,	  the	  SNB	  found	   itself	   in	  a	  situation	  that	   is	   familiar	  to	  scholars	  of	  the	  
international	  financial	  trilemma.	  Under	  conditions	  of	  capital	  mobility,	  the	  commitment	  to	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  
rate	   did	   not	   allow	   monetary	   authorities	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   policy	   rate	   to	   combat	   inflationary	   pressures.xxviii	  
Interest	  rates	  of	  nearly	  zero	  put	  upward	  pressures	  on	  domestic	  prices,	  which	  led	  the	  SNB	  to	  prioritize	  price	  
stability	  concerns.	   In	  2011,	  however,	  the	  unraveling	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  emerging	  international	  consensus	  on	  
monetary	  policy	  suggested	  that	  the	  SNB	  use	  MPR	  tools	  to	  solve	  the	  incompatibility	  between	  the	  exchange	  
rate	  choice	  and	  the	  policy	  rate	  and	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  rise	  of	  credit	  aggregates.	  In	  1978,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  SNB	  
ultimately	  opted	  for	  money	  supply	  targeting	  and	  abandoned	  the	  exchange	  rate	  target.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  
not	  indicate	  that	  the	  Swiss	  monetary	  authority	  will	  not	  abandon	  the	  exchange	  rate	  peg	  today	  or	  that	  there	  
are	  no	  other	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  periods.	  Furthermore,	  the	  comparison	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  gloss	  over	  
the	   differences	   in	   the	   economic	   context	   that	   characterized	   the	   1970s	   as	   compared	   to	   today’s	   situation.	  
More	   narrowly,	   however,	   this	   short	   review	   of	   the	   Swiss	   experience	   in	   the	   late	   1970s	   suggests	   that	   the	  
terms	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  debate	  can	  hardly	  be	  ignored	  in	  explaining	  the	  formation	  of	  domestic	  
central	  bank	  preferences.	  In	  particular,	  the	  dominant	  view	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  a	  technical,	  apolitical,	  and	  
transnational	   community	   such	   as	   that	   of	   central	   bankers	   is	   likely	   to	   exert	   a	   significant	   influence	   on	   the	  
operational	  practices	  of	   central	   banks.	  While	   in	   the	  1970s,	   conservative	  policy-­‐making	   views	  encouraged	  
the	  SNB	   to	   focus	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  price	   stability,	   in	   today’s	  environment,	   the	  unraveling	  of	   the	  pre-­‐
crisis	  monetary	  consensus	  has	  provided	  the	  SNB	  with	  more	  space	  for	  experimentation	  to	  address	  both	  the	  




The	  idea	  of	  a	  currency	  war	  is	  back	  in	  fashion.	  Guido	  Mantega	  may	  have	  been	  the	  first	  to	  revive	  memories	  of	  
the	  Great	  Depression,	  when	   countries	   around	   the	  world	   engaged	   in	   "beggar-­‐thy-­‐neighbor"	   devaluations,	  
but	   concerns	   about	   the	   growing	   politicization	   of	   exchange	   rate	   policy	   have	   been	   widespread	   (Financial	  
Times,	  Weidmann	  warns	  of	   currency	  war	   risk,	   by	  Michael	   Steen,	   21	   January	   2013),	   particularly	   after	   the	  
Bank	   of	   Japan	   shifted	   to	   an	   ultra-­‐loose	  monetary	   policy.	   Following	   the	   2013	  May	   announcement	   of	   the	  
potential	  tapering	  of	  the	  US	  Fed	  asset	  purchase	  program,	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  currency	  war	  has	  assumed	  a	  new	  
shape.	   As	   the	   currencies	   of	   several	   emerging	   market	   countries	   have	   weakened	   substantially,	   currency	  
intervention	  programs	  have	  been	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  toolkit	  that	  governments	  and	  central	  banks	  have	  used	  
to	  slow	  down	  the	  pace	  of	  depreciation.	  
This	  paper	  analyzes	  the	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  of	  one	  of	  the	  advanced	  economies	  that	  was	  hardest	  
hit	  by	  the	  volatility	  of	  capital	  flows	  following	  the	  monetary	  easing	  of	  other	  high-­‐income	  countries	  and	  the	  
quest	   for	   safe-­‐haven	  assets	   sparked	  by	   the	  deterioration	  of	   the	  Eurozone.	   In	  examining	  how	  Switzerland	  
reacted	   to	   the	   challenge	  of	   the	   appreciating	   Swiss	   franc	   on	   the	  heels	   of	   large	   capital	   inflows,	   this	   paper	  
contributes	   to	   this	   special	   issue	   by	   illustrating	   that	   capital	   controls	   have	   not	   been	   the	   only	   unorthodox	  
policies	  adopted	  to	  manage	  capital	  volatility.	  Examining	  the	  unusual	  revival	  of	  forex	  interventions	  and	  the	  
targeting	  of	  the	  exchange	  rate,	  this	  paper	  has	  also	  highlighted	  factors	  that	  shape	  central	  bankers’	  decision-­‐
making	  processes.	  Specifically,	  I	  argued	  and	  illustrated	  that	  a	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  the	  SNB’s	  exchange	  
rate	   policy	   requires	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   international	   intersubjective	   context	   in	   which	   central	  
bankers	  are	  embedded.	  	  
Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis,	  a	  lively	  debate	  has	  shaken	  the	  monetary	  views	  of	  the	  "calm	  waters	  
of	   central	   banking"	   (Davies	   and	   Green,	   2010).	   If	   the	   predominant	   monetary	   consensus	   in	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	  
period	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  strong	  and	  almost	  exclusive	  commitment	  to	  medium-­‐term	  price	  stability,	  the	  
experience	  of	   the	  crisis	  has	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   this	   limited	  understanding	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  
monetary	  policy.	  In	  this	  context	  of	  ideational	  reconsideration,	  it	  has	  become	  commonplace	  to	  hear	  that	  an	  
exclusive	  focus	  on	  price	  stability	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  ensure	  financial	  stability,	  and	  authoritative	  members	  of	  
the	   international	   central	   banking	   community	   have	   even	   forcefully	   articulated	   the	   view	   that	   financial	  
stability	  policy	  must	  be	  given	  co-­‐equal	  status	  with	  monetary	  policy	  in	  central	  bankers’	  operational	  practices	  
(Bernanke,	  2011).	  This	  renewed	  attention	  to	  financial	  stability	  has	  also	  fueled	  the	  debate	  over	  which	  policy	  
tools	   central	   banks	   can	   employ	   to	   perform	   their	   functions.	   In	   particular,	   increasing	   attention	   has	   been	  
devoted	   to	   MPR	   measures	   to	   complement	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   reliance	   on	   short-­‐term	   policy	   rates.	   In	   short,	  
although	  the	  debate	  remains	  open	  on	  the	  instruments	  through	  which	  to	  bring	  financial	  stability	  ‘up	  to	  par’	  
with	  monetary	  stability,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  agreement	  on	  the	  need	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  monetary	  policy	  has	  
opened	  up	  space	  for	  policy	  experimentation	  in	  central	  banking	  operational	  practices.	  
This	  policy	  experimentation	  is	  particularly	  evident	   in	  the	  Swiss	  case	  and	  in	  the	  modalities	  through	  
which	   the	  SNB	  managed	   the	  macroeconomic	  and	   reputational	   challenges	   that	  accompanied	   its	  exchange	  
rate	  policy.	  Indeed,	  having	  lost	  its	  control	  over	  the	  monetary	  base	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  weaken	  the	  Swiss	  franc	  
via	   forex	   interventions	   and	   pegged	   rates,	   the	   SNB	   found	   itself	   confronted	   with	   the	   risk	   of	   increasing	  
inflationary	  pressures	  that,	  if	  materialized,	  could	  jeopardize	  its	  credibility.	  To	  address	  these	  policy	  dilemmas	  
–	   and	   reflecting	   the	   debate	   that	   is	   occurring	   in	   the	   international	   central	   banking	   community	   –	   the	   SNB	  
became	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  upward	  pressures	  that	  were	  mounting	   in	  the	  domestic	  financial	  
sector	  next	  to	  those	  in	  the	  price	  level.	  Appealing	  to	  the	  international	  debate	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rate,	  the	  SNB	  also	  addressed	  the	  incompatibility	  between	  the	  interest	  rate	  and	  the	  
exchange	  rate	  by	  resorting	  to	  MPR	  measures	  to	  dampen	  the	  strong	  growth	  in	  credit	  volumes.	  	  
SNB	  behavior	   thus	   sheds	   light	  on	   the	   influence	   that	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  debate	   in	   the	   international	  
central	   banking	   community	   are	   likely	   to	   exert	   on	   central	   banks	   as	   they	   engage	   in	   domestic	   monetary	  
management.	   Because	   central	   bankers	   are	   steeped	   in	   a	   culture	   that	   values	   technical,	   transnational	  
knowledge	  and	  are	  more	  insulated	  from	  societal	  pressures	  than	  elected	  policymakers	  are,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  drivers	  behind	   the	   strategies	   they	   select	   to	   cope	  with	   specific	  problems	   is	   represented	  by	   the	  
climate	  of	  economic	  opinion	   that	  prevails	   in	   the	  community	   to	  which	   they	  belong	  and	   that	   justifies	   their	  
choices	  in	  light	  of	  evolving	  economic	  lessons	  and	  peer	  approval.	  Comparing	  contemporary	  events	  with	  the	  
events	   of	   the	   late	   1970s,	  when	   the	   SNB	   confronted	   the	   similar	   challenge	  of	   an	   appreciating	   Swiss	   franc,	  
provides	  further	  support	  for	  this	  argument.	  Indeed,	  although	  the	  SNB	  decided	  in	  1978	  –	  as	  it	  has	  now	  –	  to	  
pursue	   the	   same	   policy	   objective	   of	   explicitly	   targeting	   the	   exchange	   rate,	   the	   SNB	   interpreted	   the	  
problems	  deriving	  from	  its	  exchange	  rate	  policy	  differently	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  
on	  the	  challenges	  for	  price	  stability	   in	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  monetary	  orthodoxy	  that	  dominated	  the	  central	  
banking	  community	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  comparative	  dimension	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  todays’	  circumstances.	  
Switzerland	  is	  not	  the	  only	  country	  that	  has	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  an	  appreciating	  currency	  following	  the	  capital	  
volatility	   triggered	  by	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   Future	   research	   is	   required	   to	   ascertain	  whether	   central	  
banks	   in	   different	   countries	   also	   managed	   the	   macroeconomic	   and	   reputational	   consequences	   of	   their	  
exchange	   rate	  policies	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   reflects	   the	   tenets	  of	   the	   international	  monetary	  debate.	   In	   this	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i The situation is different at the time of writing. In particular, the 2013 May announcement of the potential tapering of the US Fed asset 
purchase program triggered downward pressures on a number of emerging market currencies, most notably on the 
Indian rupee. 
ii Focusing on a case of currency appreciation, this paper complements analyses of policymakers’ responses to pressures toward depreciation See, for instance, Walter and Willett 
(2010).  
iii The observation that advanced economies have ended official interventions is not meant to suggest that these countries never intervene in the forex markets to affect the exchange 
rate. Research has found that central banks in floating markets intervene under a fairly consistent set of conditions (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1996; Edison, 1993). Intervention has, 
for example, often been deployed to counter disordered markets by leaning against short-term fluctuations such as those triggered by large capital inflows. 
iv Whereas a central bank has a finite stock of international reserves to defend its currency against downward pressures, central banks can intervene indefinitely in forex markets to 
resist currency appreciation (at least in principle) because there is no limit to the volume of domestic currency they can print to be sold in forex markets. 
v In particular, sterilization leads to an increase in the differential between the interest rate on domestic government debt and international reserves, which creates a quasi-fiscal deficit. 
Furthermore, by preventing a decrease in the interest rate differential, sterilization does not eliminate the incentive for capital inflows to continue (c.f. Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart, 1993: 147).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vi Although the risk of deflation was the main driver of the SNB actions (as discussed below), inflation was still an 
important challenge for domestic macroeconomic management, particularly because managing the intervention requires 
determining the exact moment the monetary base must be normalized before damaging the export sector. 
vii In the Swiss case, exchange rate policy is the responsibility of the SNB and not of the federal government. This is different from what occurs in the United States (US) for instance, 
where exchange rate policy decisions are made by the Treasury and then enacted by the central bank. 
viii  On the emergence of the pre-crisis consensus see, for instance, Goodfriend (2007). 
ix Among advanced economies, the US and Japan have been notable exceptions to the trend toward inflation targeting. As for the ECB, although this central bank adopts a numerical 
inflation objective of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term, it does not claim to be an inflation targeter. 
x Opinions diverge about the extent to which monetary policy contributed to the build-up of pre-crisis imbalances. For 
opposing view see, for instance, Ahrend et al (2008) and Bernanke (2007). 
xi IMF Conference on Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons, Washington, D.C., 16-17 April 2013. 
xii On the process through which these previously marginalized arguments gained the upper hand in the financial regulatory debate, see Baker (2012). 
xiii As has been widely documented elsewhere (e.g. Baker 2012), it was exactly because the pre-crisis prevailing 
consensus largely ignored financial stability that the BIS suggestions fell on deaf ears. To put it differently, the pre-
crisis monetary consensus was solid to the point that it made central bankers unreceptive to the warnings on the risks 
that were mounting in the financial sector. 
xiv As clarified above, although the SNB does not consider itself to be "pure" as an inflation targeter, it has nonetheless incorporated key features of that framework, including a 
numerical definition of price stability. 
xv Although exchange rate policy is part of the central bank’s monetary function because of its effects on price and interest rates, it is standard practice to study the two functions 
separately.  
xvi In the pursuit of its functions, the Swiss Federal Constitution grants the SNB operational independence. As a counterweight to this independence, the SNB has a duty of 
accountability; it must report regularly to the government and the general public on monetary policy matters. 
xvii The Swiss franc depreciated 5% against the euro in the six days that followed the March 2009 announcement of the 
forex interventions. 
xviii  Communication of the Swiss National Bank, Swiss National Bank sets minimum exchange rate at CHF 1.20 per euro, 6 September 2011.   
xix As reported by Bloomberg, RBA’s Stevens Calls Switzerland’s Aussie Purchases ‘Remarkable’, by Michael Heath, 24 August 2012. 
xx Swissinfoch.com, SNB toughens stance with euro rate target, by Jessica Dacey, 6 September 2011Avaialble at 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/swiss_franc/SNB_toughens_stance_with_euro_rate_target.html?cid=31070180. 
xxi In particular, in 2008, the banking sector contributed 7.6% of the Swiss GDP, whereas the insurance industry contributed 4% of GDP. 
xxii The CCB was formally adopted by the Federal Council based on working group recommendations from the Federal Department of Finance, which also has representatives of 
the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority and the SNB among its members.  
xxiii In addition to the CCB, in June 2012, the Federal Council announced set of measures that included more stringent requirements for residential mortgage lending (i.e., an increase 
in the risk-weighting for the loan tranche exceeding the 80% loan-to-value ratio). A revision of the banking industry’s self-regulation guidelines was also adopted. 
xxiv For an accessible account of the 1978-1981 events, see Kugler and Rich (2001). 
xxv The monetary base increased by 17% from September 1978 to March 1979 (Kohli and Rich, 1986: 923) 
xxvi  Since 1975, the SNB has set targets for annual growth in the money stock (M1) within the framework of a monetary policy whose main objective was that of achieving price 
stability. 
xxvii  For an easily accessible review of the economics literature behind this thinking, see, for instance, Roberts, 2010: Ch. 2. 
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